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HOMICIDE AND THE DEATH PENALTY:






Debate over capital punishment has an extensive history. The de-
bate is complex and confused, partly because support for the death pen-
alty reflects no single theory but, instead, a conglomeration of several
different theories. These include retribution, avoidance of economic
costs associated with protracted imprisonment, a disbelief in rehabilita-
tion, and, finally, a conception that has come to be called "deterrence
theory." While each argument for the death penalty has its supporters,
it is deterrence theory that has captured public imagination and scien-
tific attention.
Briefly stated, deterrence theory holds that there is an effective rela-
tionship between specific qualilies of punishment (for example, its cer-
tainty, celerity, or severity) and the likelihood that a punishable offense
will be committed. A torollary of deterrence theory is that increasing
the penalty for an offense will decrease its frequency while decreasing
the penalty will cause infractions to multiply. Deterrence theory there-
fore envisions potential offenders as rational actors who weigh the quali-
ties of potential punishment before acting.
Although capital punishment is ancient, the genealogy of deter-
rence theory is much more recent. Prior to the last few centuries, the
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death penalty was imposed often and for a variety of offenses, some of
which seem trivial to the modern eye. For most of recorded history, the
fate of the executed was regarded as deserved and morally un-
problematic. Deterrence theory emerged in the last two or three centu-
ries as societies have, for the first time, felt obliged to provide objective
justifications for the death penalty. This need reflected a number of his-
torical developments, including a growing distaste for torture, maiming,
stoning, burning, and other forms of judicially-sanctioned violence.'
Unique attributes of the death penalty contribute to abolitionist
sentiment. The death penalty is both violent and irrevocable, ahd the
discovery of judicial errors in capital cases emphasizes the fallibility of a
finding of guilt. This recognition prompted Lafayette's famous remark,
"I shall continue to demand the abolition of the death penalty until I
have the infallibility of human judgments demonstrated to me."' 2 Simi-
larly, violent retribution has become less palatable than it once was. If,
through executions, societies seek to exact horrible suffering, it is not
clear that contemporary executions maximize this purpose, as Clarence
Darrow observed:
But why not do a good job of it. . .Why not boil them in oil, as they used
to do? Why not burn them at the stake? Why not sew them in a bag with
serpents and throw them out to sea? .. .Why not break every bone in
their body on the rack, as has often been done for such serious offenses as
heresy and witchcraft? 3
At present, retribution, avoidance of economic costs and a lack of
confidence in rehabilitation are not sufficiently acceptable justifications
for punishment by death. Deterrence theory alone, therefore, occupies
center stage in the debate over capital punishment. While deterrence
theory may conceal elements of ancient themes (such as a desire for ret-
ribution), the theory's manifest doctrine is the saving of lives; the killing
of convicted offenders is justified as a means of preserving the lives of
future victims of potential or actual offenders. In this sense, somewhat
ironically, deterrence theory is itself a manifestation of the increasing
sanctity of life.
While deterrence was implicit in punishment literature for centu-
ries, the formal emergence of this theory is often identified with Cesare
Beccaria. In his eighteenth century writings on the control and preven-
tion of crimes, Beccaria espoused the general proposition that human
I Archer, Social Deviance, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (G. Lindzey & E.
Aronson 3d ed. in press).
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behavior can be influenced by variations in punishments.4 Over the
past two centuries, deterrence theory has been prominent in political
and parliamentary debates, beginning with the French Constituent As-
sembly in 1791.5 It is interesting that the two sides of this 1791 debate
over deterrence theory survive, with little modification, in virtually all
subsequent debates:
There is a class of people with whom the horror of crime counts a great
deal less than the fear of punishment; their imagination needs to be
shaken, that necessitates something which will resound in their soul, which
will move it profoundly, so that the idea of punishment is inseparable from
that of crime. . . . The wicked does not fear God, but he does have fear,
i.e., the sentiment which the scoundrel feels at the sight of the scaffold.6
It is not the fear of punishment which stops the sacrilegious hand of the
assassin .... The scoundrel always flatters himself that he will escape the
law's surveillance. . . . Also, one cannot believe that the man who is so
barbaric that he can soak his hand in the blood of his fellow man will be
held back by the distant appearance of a cruel fate.7
The controversy has flourished in Western societies during the past
two decades. In the United States, changes in crime rates and public
opinion have fueled the debate. Support for the death penalty has
shown a long-term decline, though more recently there has been a resur-
gence. In the 1930's, surveys showed that roughly two-thirds of the
American people supported the death penalty,8 and as late as the 1950's
there was an average of seventy executions per year in the United
States.9 This number fell dramatically during the 1960's. Surveys
showed that only a minority of Americans approved of the death pen-
alty during the 1960's, and, from 1968 until January of 1977, there were
no executions in the United States.10
The recent resurgence of support for capital punishment has sup-
planted "abolitionist" sentiments with "restorationist" beliefs. The en-
gine driving this reversal is almost certainly the soaring crime rate.
After a steady decline since the 1930's, homicide rates and other crime
rates began to increase sharply in the mid-1960's.II As a single example,
the rate for homicide and nonnegligent manslaughter in the United
4 Beccaria, On the Penaly of.Death, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 39 (T. Sellin ed. 1967).
5 Hornum, Two Debates: France, 1791; England, 1956, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 55
(T. Sellin ed. 1967).
6 Id. at 62 (quoting Louis-Pierre-Joseph Prugnon, France 1791).
7 Id. at 64 (quoting J&6me Petion de Villeneuve, France 1791).
8 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1981, at 209 (1982).
9 Id. at 518.
tO Id. at 209.
11 D. Archer & R. Gartner, Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspective (Yale Uni-
versity Press 1984) (forthcoming).
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States doubled between 1963 and 1973.12 Concern over the rising crime
rate presumably caused abolitionist sentiment to wane and support for
the death penalty once again enjoys the support of a majority of the
American people. While only a handful of executions have occurred
since 1977, there has been an increase in the number of states restoring
the death penalty. As a result, more than a thousand convicts are now
under sentence of death in the United States, and the number grows
with each passing week.
The crime rate's effect on the restorationist movement is an inter-
esting non sequitur. A contemporary crime rate has no bearing on the
validity of deterrence theory; executions do not become more of a deter-
rent merely because a nation's crime rate has increased. Crime rates and
punishment have only apolitical relationship in that crime rates provide
a context in which citizens and politicians may be willing to act as zT the
case for criminal deterrence was clear and proven. As a result, it should
be stressed that scientific investigation into the deterrence hypothesis is
only one of several actors in the dynamic process of abolition and
restoration.
The history of this issue is cyclical. Although recent support for the
death penalty has mounted rapidly, it could as easily subside. Apart
from the seeming impermanence of these changes, the debate between
abolitionists and restorationists concerning the deterrence question has
centered upon a number of enduring questions, and it is to these more
durable issues that this Article is devoted.
I. DIMENSIONS OF THE DETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS
The continuing debate over capital punishment is often muddied
and convoluted because of fundamental confusion over the precise ques-
tions addressed. Therefore, any attempt to summarize this debate
should begin with a brief description of some of the different issues and
distinctions:
A. DE FACTO VERSUS DE JURE
Research on the effect of the death penalty may center either upon
the legal existence (dejure) of capital punishment, or its actual use (de
facto). This distinction is important for two reasons. First, some have
argued that the mere existence of the death penalty can have a deterrent
effect, while others claim that only actual executions will deter. Second,
even when two jurisdictions have the same de jure death penalty, there
may be great variation between their defacto applications.
12 Id
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B. SEVERITY, CERTAINTY, AND CELERITY OF PUNISHMENT
Various qualities of punishment might affect its deterrent effect.
One of these is severiy: Are severe punishments more of a deterrent than
less severe penalties? Severity has been a classic focus of the deterrence
debate since it concerns the relative deterrence value of executions on
the one hand and long prison sentences on the other. A second quality
of punishment is certainty: Is a punishment less of a deterrent if it is not
regularly imposed? This distinction is similar to the de jure versus de
facto distinction noted above. Still another quality of punishment is its
celerity: Does the length of time between arrest and a punishment influ-
ence its deterrent value?
C. EXTENT OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENTS
Some researchers believe that the death penalty can be a deterrent
even if its existence is only vaguely perceived. Others argue that the
death penalty is a deterrent only if the public is vividly aware of its
existence. This issue is of interest because convicted offenders tend not
to know which offenses merit the death penalty, or whether the state in
which they live has capital punishment. Since deterrence theory envi-
sions that potential and actual offenders will weigh the consequences of
their actions, offenders' knowledge of those consequences is of pivotal
importance.
D. RATIONAL NATURE OF THE CRIMINAL ACT
There is disagreement about the degree to which the commission of
a crime warranting the death penalty is a rational act. For example,
while an assassination may be highly purposive, most homicides are un-
planned, impulsive acts among intimates and acquaintances. Given the
volatile nature of the offense, it is improbable that participants will con-
sider the gravity of statutory punishments. Even if capital penalties are
intellectually known, therefore, violent crimes are not compatible with
the kind of dispassionate calculation envisioned by deterrence theory.
E. RATIONALES FOR PUNISHMENT
Societies can control or punish violent individuals by various means
and for different purposes. General deterrence refers to the use of punish-
ment to discourage criminal behavior of individuals other than the per-
son convicted. Spe.fic deterrence affects the future potential criminal
activity of the convicted offender. Incapacitation makes offenders less of a
threat through removal from society. Retribution uses punishment to sat-
isfy the wronged party (narrowly defined as the victim or broadly de-
fined as society) by making offenders suffer for their wrongdoing. The
1983]
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objective most often given for the death penalty is general deterrence.
Both incapacitation or specific deterrence could be achieved by incar-
ceration alone. The principle of retribution has adherents but, as al-
ready indicated, is less socially acceptable than the principle of
deterrence.
F. SIMULTANEOUS EFFECTS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
Any systematic test of deterrence theory must consider possible
feedback effects between crime rates and punishments. For example,
increased crime rates may overload the criminal justice system, reducing
its efficiency. This could diminish the likelihood or speed of arrest, con-
viction, or execution of a capital offender. Any resulting decrease in
deterrence would be due as much to the escalating crime rate as to the
nature of statutory punishments. While specific qualities of a punish-
ment may influence its effective deterrence, these qualities are not static
but vary with the crime rate and other dynamic features of the criminal
justice system.
G. SCIENTIFIC V. PHILOSOPHIC JUSTIFICATIONS
Much of the death penalty debate has centered upon scientift ef-
forts to assess capital punishment's deterrent effects. Other approaches
are, of course, moral and philosophical. These perspectives are influ-
enced not by scientific data but by fundamental beliefs regarding the
taking of human life as a form of punishment. For example, Gelles and
Straus argue that support for the death penalty increasingly reflects a
retributive orientation; that is, some people favor the death penalty not
because they believe it deters crime but because they believe that offend-
ers ought to suffer extreme punishment. 13 The increasing significance of
moral sentiments is also shown by a survey that found that seventy-five
percent of those who oppose capital punishment would not change their
position even in the face of conclusive proof that capital punishment
deters homicide. 14
III. GENERAL APPROACHES TO THE DETERRENCE QUESTION
As this list of seven issues indicates, there are several questions in
the death penalty debate that complicate efforts to summarize deter-
rence literature. In addition, exnpirical studies of the deterrence hypoth-
13 Gelles & Straus, Family Experience and Public Support of the Death Penaly, 45 AM. J. OR-
THOPSYCHIATRY 596 (1975).
14 Ellsworth & Ross, Public Opinion andJudicial Decision-Making." An Example from Research on
Capital Punishment, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 152, 168 (H. Bedau &
C. Pierce eds. 1976).
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esis are characterized by substantially different methods, scope of
analysis, quality of data and research design and, not surprisingly, dif-
ferent results as well. Over the past few years, several reviews of deter-
rence research have appeared. 15 Rather than attempt another such
review, this Article will selectively examine the issues most relevant to a
cross-national examination of the deterrence hypothesis.
Cross-sectional deterrence studies compare homicide rates at a sin-
gle point in time. Such studies require a comparison of at least two
jurisdictions. Both defacto and dejure questions have been studied using
cross-sectional designs. The defacto issue could be studied by comparing
either: (1) jurisdictions with a high execution risk (the probability of
execution for a capital conviction) to those with a low execution risk, or
(2) jurisdictions with many executions to jurisdictions with few execu-
tions within a specified period of time.
Cross-sectional studies of the dejure question compare jurisdictions
that have abolished, or never had, the death penalty to those that have
retained capital punishment. These de jure comparisons are typically
made without regard to the de facto imposition of the death penalty.
Cross-sectional studies look for linkages between higher execution risks,
or retention of the death penalty, and differences in homicide rates. 16
Cross-sectional designs are inherently weak and subject to criticism
on many grounds. For example, these studies assume that linkages be-
tween crime rates and penal structure result from the effect that the
penal structure has on crime rates. However, high or low crime rates
could have influenced the severity of punishment rather than the other
way around. Limitations such as this have led most researchers to pre-
fer longitudinal tests of the deterrence hypothesis. Longitudinal studies
examine changes in homicide rates over time, making it feasible to dis-
ambiguate the causal relationship between crimes and punishments.
Like cross-sectional studies, longitudinal studies can involve more than
one jurisdiction, thus allowing increased control over unique factors in a
single jurisdiction.
As with cross-sectional studies, longitudinal studies can examine
15 See, e.g., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds.
1976); DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANC-
TIONS ON CRIME RATES (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978); T. SELLIN, THE
PENALTY OF DEATH (1980).
16 In general, direct cross-sectional comparisons of the levels of homicide across jurisdic-
tions are of questionable validity if these jurisdictions do not share legal systems, definitions of
crime, and practices of offense reporting and recording. Partly for these reasons, cross-sec-
tional studies are almost always limited to comparisons of states with the United States. Even
so, it has been argued that there is enough variation among states on these various factors to
warrant statistical control measures. This issue is discussed later in this paper. See inj/a text
accompanying note 35.
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* either the de facto or the de jure question. De facto longitudinal studies
compare changes in the homicide rate before and after executions or as
the general risk of execution changes over time. Most longitudinal de
facto research has studied only a single jurisdiction. Dejure longitudinal
studies compare homicide rates in one or more jurisdictions before and
after the abolition or restoration of the death penalty.
Most tests of the deterrence hypothesis in this century have used
one of the approaches just described. With the exceptions indicated be-
low, very little research has extended beyond national boundaries. Most
studies have examined only individual American states or aggregate
United States statistics. With this limitation in mind, existing evidence
on the deterrence hypothesis can be summarized briefly.
IV. SELECTED EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
Debate over capital punishment is anything but modern. As early
as the 1830's, the death penalty was under attack in several American
state legislatures resulting in a moratorium on public executions. A
Massachusetts state legislator named Robert Rantoul, Jr. figured promi-
nently in this debate. In various public meetings, Rantoul presented
statistics he had assembled on the deterrence question. Rantoul's efforts
were unusually sophisticated and in fact were more extensive and de-
tailed than many studies done a century later.
Rantoul examined long-term trends in a number of European
countries and found that nations with a low proportion of executions to
convictions had declining homicide rates, precisely the reverse of what
deterrence theory would predict. Rantoul also examined short-term
patterns and found that periods with unusually high numbers of execu-
tions were followed by increased incidence of homicide. Because of its
sophistication and breadth, Rantoul's work is a landmark in the history
of deterrence research.17
Systematic deterrence research by social scientists began during a
second "reform" era in the United States early in this century. Over a
period of fifty years, social scientists conducted a number of analyses
focused primarily on the dejure issue. 18 The general conclusion drawn
17 Rantoul's work is discussed in greater detail in Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Bruta/iza-
tion What is the Efect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453 (1980).
18 These studies include R. BYE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1919);
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (T. Sellin ed. 1967); R. DANN, THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT (1935) (Bulletin 29 of the Committee on Philanthropic Labor of Philadel-
phia Yearly Meeting of Friends); Reckless, The Use of the Death Penalty, 15 CRIME & DELINQ.
43 (1969); Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence ofthe Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952); Sellin,
Capital Punishment, 25 FED. PROBATION 3 (Sept. 1961); Sutherland, Murder and the Death Pen-
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from these studies is captured by Sellin's much cited statement: "[T]he
presence of the death penalty-in law or practice-does not influence
homicide death rates."' 19 This body of de jure research has been criti-
cized on several grounds, and, by the early 1970's, some social scientists
seriously questioned the conclusion that the death penalty was not an
effective deterrent. Critics of dejure research have pursued several differ-
ent arguments:
They have complained (1) that gross homicide rates are not sensitive
enough to pick up deterrent effects, specifically, that the proportion of cap-
ital to noncapital homicides could be varying even when the overall homi-
cide rate remains unaffected by abolition; (2) that the use of contiguous
jurisdictions and before and after comparisons does not fully control for all
other factors which could conceivably be masking deterrent effects; and (3)
that deterrent effects may not be "jurisdictionally specific" within a na-
tion, that people may not be responsive to the presence of, or changes in,
capital statutes in the particular state where they reside, as distinct from
neighboring states.20
These criticisms prompted new research designs using different
methods. Relying chiefly on the statistical use of multiple regression, a
number of studies have tried to control for differences across jurisdic-
tions or over time that could influence homicide rates. In this way, re-
searchers seek to determine how much of any observed change in the
homicide rate is due to the existence of capital punishment and actual
executions or, alternately, to nonpunishment variables such as changes
in age structure and urbanization.
One of the first of these studies was conducted by Ehrlich.2 1 Using
aggregate homicide data for the United States for the period 1933-70,
Ehrlich analyzed the effect .of the probability of execution upon homi-
cide rates. Ehrlich also controlled for a variety of other factors, includ-
ing unemployment, age distribution, and per capita income. Based
upon this analysis, Ehrlich concluded that executions did have a deter-
rent effect and, specifically, that between seven and eight homicides
were deterred by each execution.22
Although Ehrlich's work found an eager audience among many
policy makers, a number of researchers using similar and equally sophis-
ticated methods have extensively criticized his work. 23 Many of these
alr, 15 J. AM. INST. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 522 (1925); Vold, Can the Death Penalty Prevent
Crime?, 12 PRISON J. 4 (1932); Void, Extent and Trend of Capital Crimes in the United States, 284
ANNALS 1 (1952).
19 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 138 (r. Sellin ed. 1967).
20 W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 20 (1974).
21 Ehrlich, The Deterrent  ect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM.
ECON. REv. 397 (1975).
22 Id. at 414.
23 Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment,
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criticisms have been thoroughly summarized elsewhere24 and need not
be repeated here. Because Ehrlich's work is one of very few studies to
find any support for the deterrence hypothesis, it has garnered wide-
spread scientific interest.
Attempted replications of Ehrlich's work using similar methods
(multivariate analyses and econometric methods) have failed, however,
to find a deterrence effect. For example, Loftin did an elaborate ecologi-
cal analysis of crime rates and social characteristics in the United States.
When social and economic variables such as poverty, education, and
family structure were controlled, Loftin's study found little or no evi-
dence for the deterrence hypothesis. 25 Similarly, Brier and Fienberg
used econometric models to test for a deterrence effect, and they con-
cluded that the claims made in Ehrlich's 1975 study were not supported
by the evidence.26 Finally, some of the most interesting longitudinal evi-
dence involves separate time-series analyses from five different states ex-
amining the relationship between execution risk and homicide rates.
Here, again, the evidence runs counter to deterrence theory in three of
the five states examined. 27
In recent research, there is even some evidence for what might be
called an "antideterrent" effect. A fine-grained study by Bowers and
Pierce examined monthly homicide rates in New York State between
1907 and 1963 and found an average increase of two homicides in the
month after an execution. This finding led Bowers and Pierce to postu-
late, in direct opposition to the deterrence hypothesis, a "brutalizing"
effect, that is, that executions might increase rather than deter homi-
85 YALE LJ. 187 (1975); Brier & Fienberg, Recent Econometric Modelling of Crime and Punishment."
Supportfor the Deterrence Hypothesis?, in U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, INDICATORS OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 82 (S.
Fienberg & A. Reiss eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as INDICATORS OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE]; Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent Efects of Capital Punishment: An Assessment of the
Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES, supra note 23, at 336; Loftin, Alternative Estimates of the Impact of
Certainty and Severity of Punishment on Levels of Homicide in American States, in INDICATORS OF
CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, at 75; Passell & Taylor, The Deterrence Controverj. A
Reconsideration of the Time Series Evidence, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (H.
Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976).
24 See, e.g., DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMI-
NAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES, supra note 15.
25 Loftin, supra note 23.
26 Bier & Fienberg, supra note 23.
27 See Bailey, An Anay~sis of the Deterrent Eect of the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 10 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 29 (1978); Bailey, Deterrence and the Death Penalty for Murder in Oregon, 16 WILLAM-
ETTE L.J. 67 (1979); Bailey, Deterrence and the Death Penalty for Murder in Utah. A Time Series
Analysis, 5 J. CONTEMP. L. 1 (1978); Bailey, The Deterrent Efect of the Death Penalty for Murder in
Ohio.: A Time Series Analysis, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51 (1979); Bailey, The Deterrent E ect of the
Death Penalty in California, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 743 (1979).
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cides.28 In summary, recent studies of the defacto issue do not contradict
the long-standing conclusion from dejure research that the death penalty
has no consistent, demonstrable deterrent effect.
A number of specific issues continue to bear upon new research re-
garding deterrence theory. Two of these are of generic importance, and
recent evidence on each can be summarized briefly.
A. ARE GROSS HOMICIDE RATES SENSITIVE ENOUGH TO PICK UP
DETERRENT EFFECTS?
Over fifty years ago, Sutherland stated that "the ordinary practice
of drawing conclusions regarding changes in murder rates from changes
in homicide rates is logically invalid. But it is the only method that can
be used, since we have no other statistics available. '29 Despite the subse-
quent introduction of the Uniform Crime Reports in 1933, the lack of
specific, disaggregated statistics has remained a problem:
In the United States, generally only one type of homicide-murder in the
first degree-is punishable by death, with murder in the second degree and
voluntary manslaughter usually being punished by imprisonment. Typi-
cally, however, investigations of the death penalty have operationally de-
fined premeditated murder as homicide, a much more inclusive offense
category. This practice has been necessitated by the fact that no alterna-
tive statistics are currently available on a nationwide basis that break
down homicide by type and degree. As a result, investigators have been
forced to make a large and possibly erroneous assumption whether they
use police or mortality statistics, that the proportion of first degree murders
to total homicides remains constant so that the statistics on the latter pro-
vide a reasonably adequate indicator of capital offenses. 30
In order to test this crucial assumption, Bailey collected disaggre-
gated data on first- and second-degree murder convictions from a
number of state court systems. He then examined the relationship be-
tween capital punishment and murder rates in a manner similar to ear-
lier studies by Schuessler 31 and Sellin.32 Bailey's approach differed from
these earlier analyses, however, in that "the murder data examined...
permit a direct rather than indirect assessment of the relationship be-
tween capital homicides and the death penalty."33 Bailey found no evi-
dence for a deterrent effect whether one examined second-degree, first-
degree, or all homicides combined. This research cast doubt on claims
28 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 17.
29 Sutherland, supra note 18, at 522.
30 Bailey, Murder and the Death Penalty, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 416, 418 (1974).
31 Schuessler, supra note 18.
32 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (T. Sellin ed. 1967); THE DEATH PENALTY (T. Sellin ed. 1959).
33 Bailey, supra note 30, at 418.
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that the deterrent effect existed but had been masked by the insensitiv-
ity of gross homicide rates.
B. DOES THE USE OF CONTIGUOUS JURISDICTIONS, ALONG WITH THE
USE OF BEFORE AND AFTER COMPARISONS, FAIL TO
CONTROL FOR ALL FACTORS WHICH COULD MASK
DETERRENT EFFECTS?
Ernest van den Haag, a strong critic of much deterrence research,
has argued that "[h]omicide rates do not depend exclusively on penalties
any more than other crime rates. A number of conditions which influ-
ence the propensity to crime, demographic, economic, or social, . . .
may influence the homicide rate."' 34 To control for these factors, some
investigators have compared only presumably similar jurisdictions such
as contiguous states.
Because of differences between even contiguous jurisdictions, critics
have claimed that this procedure provides inadequate controls. In re-
sponse, Bailey compared states with and without the death penalty,
while controlling for two socioeconomic and five demographic variables.
As an additional control, retentionist and abolitionist states with similar
rates of aggravated assault were compared to hold constant potentially
significant etiological factors. Regardless of which control variables
were included, Bailey found retentionist states had higher murder rates
than abolitionist states.3 5 Again, the evidence runs contrary to the de-
terrence hypothesis. Therefore, while the inclusion of additional control
variables would certainly have improved many studies, additional con-
trols would not appear to have changed the conclusion that the death
penalty does not deter crime.
V. GENERAL AND SPECIFIC DETERRENCE HYPOTHESES
According to the general deterrence hypothesis in its de jure form,
ceteris paribus, abolition of capital punishment increases homicide rates.
The defacto form of the hypothesis is concerned with actual execu-
tions rather than changes in policy or law. While defacto research has
incontestable importance, the dejure issue is inherently interesting since
it is central to policy decisions. In addition to what is here called the
general deterrence hypothesis, a number of more precise deterrence hy-
potheses can be derived.
34 van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 78 ETHICS 280, 285 (1968).
35 Bailey, supra note 30.
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A. OFFENSE DETERRENCE
Criminal penalties, and therefore their hypothesized deterrent ef-
fects, are offense-specific. Where it exists, the death penalty is prescribed
for a society's most grievous offenses. In terms of deterrence theory, the
death penalty should have its most direct effects on the offenses for
which the death penalty can be imposed.
This specific hypothesis, which might be called "offense deter-
rence," postulates that capital punishment will have its most perceptible
effects on capital crimes, the offenses executions are imposed to deter.
In terms of offense deterrence, the effect of capital punishment on lesser
crimes is less predictable. If the hypothesis of offense deterrence has
merit, abolition of the death penalty should be followed by increases in
capital offenses. In addition, the increases in these capital offenses
should be larger and more consistent than any other post-abolition
crime rate changes.
B. RESIDUAL DETERRENCE
If the general deterrence hypothesis is correct, abolition should be
followed by homicide rate increases. There is disagreement, however,
about the temporal aspects' of this relationship and, specifically, when
the increases can be expected to occur.36 Dejure case studies have uni-
formly found that the abolition of the death penalty does not produce
any sudden or dramatic changes in homicide rates. While this result is
frequently cited as evidence against the deterrence hypothesis, some
have argued that it may reflect only public ignorance of changes in capi-
tal statutes.37 Individuals, ignorant of changes, may continue to be de-
terred as if capital punishment still existed.
Although research indicates that public ignorance of the law is
widespread,38 it seems reasonable that people might be better informed
about capital punishment because of the extremity of the punishment,
extensive media attention, and frequent controversy. Some deterrence
theorists still believe, however, that genuine deterrence effects are
36 Comparative examinations of homicide rates before and after abolition ... [or]...
the restoration of the death penalty, have. . . questioned the efficacy of capital punish-
ment. These investigations reveal that states that have abolished the death penalty have
generally experienced no unusual increase in homicide. Moreover, the reintroduction of
the death penalty (eleven states have abolished the death penalty but later restored it)
has not been followed by a significant decrease in homicide.
Bailey, supra note 30, at 417.
37 See van den Haag, supra note 34.
38 In a survey of public awareness of recent increases in criminal penalties, half the re-
spondents were unaware of the changes and could not even guess whether penalties had in-
creased or decreased. Miller, Rosenthal, Miller & Ruzek, Public Knowledge of Criminal Penalties:
A Research Report, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 205 (S. Grupp ed. 1971).
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masked by public ignorance. "A constant homicide rate, despite aboli-
tion, may occur because of unawareness and not because of lack of de-
terrence: people remain deterred for a lengthy interval by the severity of
the penalty in the past, or by the severity of penalties used in similar
circumstances nearby. '3 9
This hypothesis posits the existence of what might be called
"residual deterrence," a deterrent effect that lingers after the death pen-
alty is abolished. Residual deterrence may complicate studies of the
death penalty, but it does not, as some have implied, make systematic
evaluation impossible. For example, even if residual deterrence exists, it
should weaken over time as more people become aware that the law has
changed; residual deterrence should be strong in the first year after abo-
lition, weaker five years later, and weaker still as time goes on. As a
result, if general deterrence theory is correct, one would expect to see
progressive increases in homicide rates as residual deterrence erodes in
the years following abolition.
C. VICARIOUS DETERRENCE
A parallel argument, that citizens are deterred by the existence of
the death penalty in adjacent jurisdictions, might be called "vicarious
deterrence." If deterrence is not jurisdiction-specific, people living in a
state without the death penalty might be deterred by an incorrect belief
in the possibility of capital punishment. If vicarious deterrence exists,
the existence of any capital statute could affect citizens in retentionist
and abolitionist states alike.4° As a result, the effects of abolition might
be invisible in de jure studies conducted in contiguous states.
The possibility of vicarious deterrence lends increased importance
to cross-national research. If vicarious deterrence has validity, one
would expect to find invisible or "masked" deterrence in dejure studies
of local jurisdictions, but not in studies of independent societies. A
cross-national study therefore provides a relatively pure test of the de jure
hypothesis, unaffected by vicarious deterrence, because it seems ex-
tremely unlikely that legislation in one nation would have any vicarious
deterrent effects in another nation.
Despite their obvious importance, cross-national studies of deter-
rence are relatively rare and large-sample comparisons are almost un-
known. In the early 1930's, the (British) Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment heard extensive testimony from expert witnesses represent-
ing European and Commonwealth nations. Based upon the available
evidence, the Commission concluded: "Capital Punishment may be
39 van den Haag, supra note 34, at 286.
40 Id
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abolished in this country [Britain] without endangering life or property
or impairing the security of society. ' 41 Almost two decades later, the
Commission was reestablished for a more extensive, four-year examina-
tion of the question. The new Commission affirmed the earlier conclu-
sion: "There is no clear evidence in any of the figures we have examined
that the abolition of capital punishment has led to an increase in the
homicide rate, or that its reintroduction has led to its fall."'42 The 1962
European Committee on Crime Problems supported this conclusion.43
The trend toward abolition increased during the 1960's but there
have been no systematic efforts during this period to collect and evalu-
ate data from a large sample of abolitionist nations. Individual case
studies vary greatly in their procedures and use of controlled compari-
sons. As a result, existing cross-national evidence suffers from a confus-
ing patchwork of results.
While a cross-national test of the deterrence hypothesis is not with-
out complications, the principal obstacle has been the absence of longi-
tudinal offense data from a large sample of societies. A cross-national
archive of data on rates of homicide and four other offenses now exists.
Called the Comparative Crime Data File (CCDF), this archive contains
time series data beginning in 1900 for 110 nations and forty-four major
international cities.44
With appropriate methodological caution, the CCDF makes possi-
ble a large number of comparative investigations, including research on
deterrence theory. Data from the CCDF have been used to examine the
effects of war on rates of violent crime,45 urban homicide rates,46 and a
number of generic methodological issues.47 Because of the depth and
41 E. CALVERT, THE DEATH PENALTY ENQUIRY 48 (1931) (quoting Report from the Se-
lect Committee on Capital Punishment 94 (1930)).
42 GREAT BRITAIN ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT 23
(1953).
43 EUROPEAN COMMITrEE ON CRIME PROBLEMS, THE DEATH PENALTY IN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES (M.M. Ancel, Chair) (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 1962).
44 D. ARCHER & R. GARTNER, supra note 11; Archer & Gartner, Homicide in 110 Nations:
The Development of the Comparative Crime Data File, in 2 CRIMINOLOGY REVIEW YEARBOOK 433
(E. Bittner & S. Messinger eds. 1980).
45 Archer & Gartner, Legal Homicide and its Consequences, in VIOLENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
MURDER AND AGGRESSION 219 (I. Kutash, S. Kutash & L. Schlesinger eds. 1978); Archer &
Gartner, Peacetime Casualties.- The Eects of War on the Violent Behavior of Non-Combatants, in
READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 236 (E. Aronson ed. 1981); Archer & Gartner, The
Myth of the Violent Veteran, 10 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 94 (Dec. 1976); Archer & Gartner, Violent
Acts and Violent Tmes. A Comparative Approach to Postwar Homicide Rates, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 937
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Violent Acts and Violent Times]; Archer & Gartner, War and Violent
Crime, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (S. Kadish ed. 1983) (forthcoming).
46 Archer, Gartner, Akert & Lockwood, Cities and Homicide: A New Look at an Old Paradox,
in 1 COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY 73 (R. Tomasson ed. 1978).
47 Archer & Gartner, Homicide in 110 Nations.- The Development of the Comparative Crime Data
File, in READINGS IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 78 (L. Shelley ed. 1981).
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breadth of its data, the CCDF offers considerable potential for system-
atic research on deterrence theory.
VI. CROSS-NATIONAL DATA ON FOURTEEN CASES OF ABOLITION
A first step in any cross-national test involves identifying sample
abolition cases. This task is more complicated than one might imagine
since the degree of abolition may vary from one society to another.
Some may abolish capital punishment for mortal offenses generally but
retain it for specific crimes, such as the murder of a prison guard by a
prisoner serving a life term. Other nations may eliminate the death pen-
alty but provide for its revival during civil emergencies or martial law.
The de jure question is therefore complicated by the need for discrete
classification when, in fact, shades of abolition may be present.
One solution to this classification problem is to roughly define a
jurisdiction as "abolitionist" if capital punishment is generally prohib-
ited, even if allowed for extraordinary crimes. It should be emphasized
that this is a dejure classification; nations in which no executions have
occurred for long periods of time cannot be considered abolitionist
under this definition if capital punishment remains the law. A further
problem in choosing abolition cases is determining the date of the aboli-
tion; it could be the date on which the penal code is changed or the date
on which the change becomes effective.
After examining different lists of abolitionist nations and dates, we
adopted a modified form of the classifications made by Bowers48 and
Joyce.49 The list was compared to offense rate data from the Compara-
tive Crime Data File. This process yielded a total of fourteen sets of
time series data for twelve distinct cases of abolition. In two cases, Aus-
tria and Finland, separate records for Vienna and Helsinki provided the
opportunity to "replicate" national cases with urban data.50
Before presenting the results of these comparisons, it should be em-
phasized that most efforts to isolate the independent effects of abolition
err on the side of simplification. Offense rates are driven by many fac-
tors, and single-variable evaluations understate this complexity by pre-
tending that these other forces do not exist. For example, a number of
abolitions occurred around war time, and recent research indicates that
wars frequently elevate post-war rates of violent crime.51 Similarly, vast
demographic changes-such as the coming of age of individuals from
48 W. BOWERS, supra note 20, at 178.
49 J. JOYCE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT; A WORLD VIEW 85 (1961).
50 Data for the 1890 Italian case predates the beginning of the CCDF and were obtained
from source data for the CCDF. Data for Canada were supplemented by information from
recent Statistics Canada publications.
51 Violent Acts and Violent Times, supra note 45.
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the post-World War II "baby boom" cohort-can greatly inflate offense
rates or otherwise complicate efforts to assess the effects of legal changes.
In cross-national studies of deterrence, therefore, the effect of abolition is
inevitably muddied by other changes.52
For reasons already discussed, a longitudinal design is preferable to
crude cross-sectional comparisons. Because of the infinitely large
number of idiosyncratic national characteristics, it makes little or no
sense to compare abolitionist and retentionist countries at one moment
in time. The longitudinal approach, which examines national exper-
iences over time, provides a much stronger basis for inferences about the
effect of abolition. The depth and breadth of data in the Comparative
Crime Data File allow both longitudinal comparisons and additional
control procedures.
VII. CROSS-NATIONAL TESTS OF SPECIFIC DETERRENCE
HYPOTHESES
Data from this sample of fourteen cases can be analyzed in a
number of ways to provide a test of the general deterrence theory predic-
tion that abolition of the death penalty causes a perceptible increase in
homicide rates. More precise deterrence hypotheses can be examined as
well. Vicarious deterrence, the alleged geographic spillover of deterrence
from retentionist jurisdictions to abolitionist jurisdictions, is controlled
by the examination of sovereign nations. Residual deterrence, the alleged
temporal spillover of deterrence from retentionist years to abolitionist
years, can be tested by examining post-abolition time intervals of pro-
gressively greater lengtls. Ofense deterrence, the prediction that post-abo-
lition changes will be most conspicuous in rates of capital offenses, can
be tested by contrasting homicide with several noncapital crimes.
A. GENERAL DETERRENCE
Table 1 depicts an initial comparison of the short-term effects of
abolition. The percentages in this table indicate the increase or decrease,
in homicide rates between the year prior to abolition and the year after
abolition. The homicide rates upon which the percentages are based are
included as a cautionary feature. In some cases, such as New Zealand,
the homicide rate is so low in absolute terms that the addition of a single
homicide can double the national offense rate. The precise indicators in
52 Given sufficient data, it would be possible to introduce controls for these specific fac-
tors, although other unrecognized sources of variation would of course remain uncontrolled.
In the absence of data forpost hoc controls of this kind, it is important to have enough cases in
the analysis to minimize the statistical probability of competing explanations for any ob-
served offense rate changes.
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this comparison-offenses known, convictions, etc.-are also shown
since these differ for the fourteen cases.
TABLE 1
HOMICIDE RATE LEVELS BEFORE AND AFTER ABOLITION: ONE
YEAR COMPARISONS
One Year
One Year Pre- Post-Abolition
Date of Offense Abolition Homicide
Jurisdiction Abolition Indicator* Homicide Rate Rate % Change
Austria 1968 e .72 .71 -1%
England and Wales 1965 a .36 .35 -3
Finland 1949 a 1.05 .72 -31
Helsinki 1949 a 1.96 1.90 -3
Israel 1954 a 4.00 1.72 -57
Italy 1890 a 13.30 12.94 -3
Sweden 1921 b .43 .15 -65
Switzerland 1942 d 45.25 35.65 -21
Vienna 1968 e .93 .93 0
Canada 1967 a 1.10 1.52 38
Denmark 1930 c 33.89 35.68 5
Netherlands Antilles 1957 a 13.19 20.32 54
New Zealand 1961 b .04 .08 100"
Norway 1905 b .35 .39 11
*Key to Offense Indicators:
a = homicide offenses known
b = murder, manslaughter, or homicide convictions
c = violent offenses known
d = violent offenses convictions
e = criminal statistics
Because of an extremely low base rate, this 100% increase reflects a change from 1 to 2
cases.
With these cautions in mind, the picture in Table 1 is one of little
change, and, in fact, eight of the fourteen cases (fifty-seven percent)
show a homicide rate decrease in the year following abolition while only
five (thirty-six percent) show an increase. In this crude short-term com-
parison, therefore, there is no evidence for the deterrence hypothesis. De
jure abolition appears to have had little effect and, if anything, appears
to slightly decrease homicide rates.
B. RESIDUAL DETERRENCE
If one subscribes to the hypothesis of residual deterrence, however,
the comparison in Table I is inconclusive. The effects of deterrence still
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could be present though masked by public ignorance of abolition, par-
ticularly in the first year following this change. For this reason, Table 2
compares longer intervals. It is unlikely that residual deterrence could
continue to affect behavior five years after abolition, and the hypothesis
becomes even less plausible over longer intervals. The five-year statistics
in Table 2 compare the five years of homicide data before and after
abolition. This comparison does not include all fourteen cases since
some entries in the CCDF did not have data for all of these years. The
"maximum possible" comparison in this table reflects the longest inter-
vals before and after abolition for which homicide data were available.
Again, in this comparison there is little evidence for the deterrence
hypothesis in general or residual deterrence in particular. In the five-
year comparison, half of the ten cases for which the comparison can be
made show homicide rate increases following abolition while half show
decreases. There is even less support for the deterrence hypothesis when
longer intervals are examined. When intervals of maximum possible
length are compared, only five of the fourteen (thirty-six percent) cases
show homicide rate increases after abolition, while eight (fifty-seven per-
cent) show decreases. This finding runs counter to the hypothesis of
residual deterrence. Since homicide rate decreases are found most con-
TABLE 2
HOMICIDE RATE CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER
ABOLITION: LONGER TRENDS
Five Year Maximum Possible Years Before
Jurisdiction One Year Meansa Comparisonb Abolition/Years After
Austria -1% 32% 9% (15,5)
Canada 38 63 67 (5,6)
Denmark 5 - 4 (9,2)
England and Wales -3 18 27 (14,7)
Finland -31 -40 -59 (22,18)
Helsinki -3 -27 -57 (22,18)
Israel -57 -53 -65 (5,16)
Italy -3 -5 -30' (10,24)
Netherlands Antilles 54 - -4 (2,13)
New Zealand 100 117 0 (10,11)
Norway 11 - -24 (2,35)
Sweden -65 - -63 (1,28)
Switzerland -21 -36 -46 (13,28)
Vienna 0 94 85 (15,5)
a Comparison of mean offense levels for five-year periods before and after abolition.
b Comparison of mean offense levels for maximum length periods before and after abolition.
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sistently when long intervals are compared, the idea that deterrence pro-
gressively erodes in the years following abolition seems untenable.
C. OFFENSE DETERRENCE
A final comparison addresses the question of whether capital pun-
ishment has specific offense deterrence. The breadth of data in the
CCDF makes it possible to contrast changes in capital offenses with
changes in noncapital crimes. A deterrence theorist could conceivably
argue that the patterns in Tables 1 and 2 conceal massive downward
trends in crime generally and that capital offense rates might be falling
relatively more slowly than noncapital offense rates. The key test of of-
fense deterrence, therefore, is whether homicide rate increases or de-
creases after abolition are greater, in absolute or relative terms, than
increases or decreases for noncapital crimes.
Table 3 examines the offense deterrence hypothesis by comparing
changes before and after abolition for three time periods-one year, five
years, and the maximum interval possible-for homicide and five non-
capital offenses. Median offense rate changes for all cases are shown at
the bottom of Table 3. Missing percentages indicate that the compari-
son could not be made for this offense during this particular interval
using the data in the CCDF.
In general, the data run strongly counter to the hypothesis of of-
fense deterrence. No matter which time interval is examined, noncapi-
tal offense rates show increases larger than the changes observed for
homicide rates. While noncapital crime rates increased following aboli-
tion-perhaps as a result of demographic or other changes-rates of
homicide were stationary or declining. This difference between capital
and noncapital rate changes is striking: it is difficult to imagine a result
that more clearly contradicts the theory of deterrence. These cross-
national findings fail to support the offense deterrence hypothesis and,
in fact, provide strategic evidence that the death penalty has no discern-
ible effect on homicide rates.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
If capital punishment is a more effective deterrent than the alterna-
tive of life imprisonment, its abolition ought to be followed by homicide
rate increases. The evidence examined here fails to support and, indeed,
repeatedly contradicts this proposition. In this cross-national sample,
abolition was followed more often than not by absolute decreases in
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homicide rates. Further, the homicide rates of these nations also de-
creased relative to the rates of noncapital offenses after abolition. Both
of these findings hold true whether comparisons are made for short, me-
dium, or the longest feasible time periods.
This cross-national research design controls for some possible de-
fects in previous studies, including vicarious deterrence, the alleged jurisdic-
tional nonspecificity of capital punishment. The results of this
comparative analysis contradict general deterrence theory, and also re-
ject specific hypotheses derived from this theory, such as residual deterrence
and offense deterrence. These findings lend new weight to the body of re-
search running counter to deterrence theory:
In the face of the mounting evidence against any deterrent advantage of
the death penalty, proponents increasingly find themselves affirming more
idiosyncratic explanations for the effects they presume the death penalty
has, but which research has yet to reveal. . . .With each new set of find-
ings their task becomes more arduous and their arguments become less
plausible.53
As indicated earlier, empirical evidence on deterrent effects is only
one participant in the debate over capital punishment. Public attitudes
toward crime and criminals, moral sentiments, and changing intellec-
tual fashions also play major roles. The function of scientific inquiry in
this debate, while limited, is also important. Research like that
presented in this Article addresses deterrence, the most pervasive justifi-
cation for capital punishment.
Combined with previous research, evidence from this comparative
analysis consistently contradicts testable elements of deterrence theory.
While there may be some persuasive reasons for capital punishment-
such as retribution or economics-the deterrence of potential offenders
is not among them. Other justifications for the death penalty can and
presumably will be debated, but the deterrence hypothesis must be re-
garded at this time as scientifically insupportable.
Although this Article is grounded in empirical research, the evi-
dence complements a very different argument, one grounded in logic
and philosophy rather than science. Inquiry in this area addresses a
question of literal life and death significance. In the United States the
populations on death rows grow rapidly, and the debate over the death
penalty is anything but abstract. In addition, the deterrence hypothesis
is currently under discussion in many courts and state legislatures.
Clearly, the stakes in this debate are unusually high. Precisely for
this reason, it seems fair to assume that the burden of proof is upon the
restorationists to show that a deterrent effect does exist; unless, of course,
53 W. BOWERS, supra note 20, at 163.
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our society is prepared to shift from deterrence to retribution or eco-
nomic arguments as justifications for capital punishment. For the same
reason, this burden of proof should require unusually exacting standards
of evidence. Given the extreme and irrevocable nature of capital pun-
ishment, deterrence should be accepted as a justification for the death
penalty only if this effect can be shown to be reliable, consistent, and
strong. If the deterrent effect is anything less, executions cannot pro-
duce anything other than the deaths of the executed.
Empirical support for the deterrence hypothesis, including the evi-
dence presented here, obviously cannot meet this exacting standard.
The evidence runs contrary to deterrence theory, and, while more re-
search can of course be done, the mere existence of this consistently con-
trary evidence demonstrates that the deterrent effect-if one exists at
all-is not reliable, consistent, or strong. If the deterrent effect had these
robust qualities, the effect surely would have surfaced vividly and re-
peatedly in these investigations.
The available evidence suggests that no deterrent effect exists, or at
the very least, that no deterrent effect exists the strength and size of
which could serve as a sufficient justification for capital punishment.
Although this conclusion is based on empirical evidence, it is supported
by logical and philosophical considerations of the death penalty:
Capital punishment is certainly among the most extreme or severe depri-
vations that can be imposed as a punishment. As a result the burden of
justifiability falls in a correspondingly heavy fashion upon the defender of
that kind of punishment . ... As moral agents we ought, I believe, to
require more convincing, if not decisive, reasons of a sort I am unable to
bring to light before the decision to punish-especially by a deprivation as
total and cataclysmic for the individual as death-can be the morally de-
fensible one for us to make.54
The issue of the exceptional burden of proof therefore provides
common ground for logical and scientific arguments about the death
penalty. A humane and rational society should consider taking human
life only if there is overwhelming evidence that this act will save lives by
deterring violence. As this comparative study and other research make
abundantly clear, there is no overwhelming evidence for deterrence, and
the contrary conclusions of existing research suggest that such evidence
for deterrence will not be forthcoming. In the absence of thoroughly
persuasive evidence, it seems inconceivable that our society would be
willing to execute people in pursuit of what is almost certainly a hope-
less objective.
54 Wasserstrom, Capital Punishment as Punishment: Some Theoretical Issues and Objections, 7
MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 473, 478, 499 (P. French, T. Vehling, Jr. & H. Wettstein
eds. 1982).
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